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The Reagan Effect: Self-presentation in
humans and computers
ROLAND POSNER
In the sports section of a German newspaper we read:
It is a long and rocky road. But the world boxing champion Henry Maske
appears to have already come a long way. The Light Heavyweight Champion
says of himself: 'Now I am more like the Henry Maske that I really am'.
(Der Tagesspiegel, December 11, 1993: 12)
The author of the article explains what Maske meant: The positive
image that he has built up during his four short years as a professional
boxer should now pay off'.
A fashion consultant instructs us: 'If I no longer know where I stand
and why, I have to at least be standing in a positive light' (Sommer and
Wind 1991: 213). He justifies this theoretically as follows:
The external presentation of the self no longer conveys Ί am such and such',
but rather Ί could be such and such'. The expression becomes a simple impres-
sion. This is evidenced in politics: The politician simulates a person who is
fighting for certain purposes, the professional simulates a person who has the
profession that he or she is currently carrying out. Whether this is his/her profes-
sion is not important: What counts is the professional execution, the impressive
performance.
A psychoanalyst writes about a colleague:
I have never met another analyst, who ... was more unavoidably himself than
Donald W. Winnicott. This invulnerable way of being himself made it possible
for him to be a different person to each of the most different kinds of people.
Those who have met him had their own Winnicott. Winnicott never threatened
the pictures that the others had made of him by trying to force his own way of
being on them. And that is why he always remained so unyieldingly himself:
Winnicott. (Khan 1977: 348)
Let me assume that you are willing to participate in a discourse of
this type. Then you might ask yourself along with me: what does it mean
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'to be unavoidably oneself — is not everyone this? How can 'being
invulnerably oneself lead someone to be seen differently by every other
person? How can someone be 'unyieldingly himself by not forcing
'his own way of being' on others?
These questions lay out the subject of the following deliberations. My
topic is the self as a reality, that is, another's self as well as your own
self. As you will see, the creation of a reality such as this involves self-
presentation and self-development, simulation and illusion. Therefore,
I will examine in the first part of this paper the types of selves; in the
second part, the kinds of presentation; and in the third part, the processes
of self-presentation. In doing so, and in accordance with a success-
ful strategy of artificial intelligence research, I will talk about people:
people like you and me. I will generalize the results, however, so that they
can be applied to all interactive cognitive systems. This will allow me to
define the minimum requirements that a cognitive system must meet in
order to develop a self.
To gain a clearer understanding, it is helpful to keep a specific person
and a certain cognitive system in mind. In the latter case, just consider
your PC and ask yourself how you would have to improve its hardware
and software so that you could regard it as unavoidably, invulnerably, and
unyieldingly being itself in the manner described by the psychoanalyst.
Ronald Reagan as self-presenter
As an example of a human cognitive system I have chosen a person,
whom you all know through the media — the greatest self-presenter of
the eighties: the stage performer, radio announcer, football reporter,
movie star, labor leader, corporate spokesman, politician in the roles
of Governor-maker, Governor of California (1967-1974), President of
the United States (1980-1988), and elder statesman Ronald W. Reagan
(shown in Plate 1 together with his wife, Nancy).
Does this person have a self at all? you might ask. Was he not a ball
bounced around in changing contexts? Did he ever have a personality
of his own? If he really did practice self-presentation, what was it that
he presented? His own personality or the one that each different role
provided him with: the role as an actor, as a reporter, as an official,
as a politician?
As a public person, Reagan did not manage his self carelessly. He
wrote (or had others write) two autobiographies and he encouraged a
number of authors to write his biography. His first autobiography was
titled Where's the Rest of Me? (1965) and the second, An American
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 11.10.18 15:42
The Reagan Effect 447
Plate 1. Ronald and Nancy Reagan 1984 (in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States: Ronald Reagan, January 1 to June 29, 1984: i)
Life (1990). Both works tried to paint a coherent picture of him as a
person, starting with his experiences as a youth and as an actor.
It is significant that in the title of his first autobiography, Reagan
repeated a sentence that, when he said it in a movie, brought him high
regard as an actor: 'Where's the rest of me?' The movie in question is
King's Row, filmed in 1941, in which Reagan played Drake McHugh, a
jovial young man from the countryside. McHugh lost his money during
the Great Depression, took on a job as a railroad worker, had an
accident and fell into the hands of the surgeon Dr. Gordon. Gordon's
daughter was one of Drake's girlfriends and Gordon had already done
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Plate 2. After the operation, Drake calls his wife and asks her desperately: 'Randy, where 's the
rest of me?' Ronald Reagan as Drake McHugh in the movie King's Row (USA 1941, director:
Samuel Wood; photograph: Stiftung Deutsche Kinemathek, Berlin)
everything he could to change his daughter's mind about wanting to
marry Drake. Although, in the meantime, Drake had married another
woman, Gordon still resented him so much that he unnecessarily
amputated both of Drake's legs at the hips. When Drake awoke from
the anaesthesia, he felt for his legs, called his wife, and cried: 'Randy,
where's the rest of me?' Reagan succeeded in portraying Drake so well
in this scene that he was nominated for an Oscar (see Plate 2).
Drake's question 'Where is the rest of me?' referred both to his physical
and mental self. His body had been mutilated, making it impossible for
him to continue living as before. In the first paragraph of his 1965 auto-
biography, Reagan writes that his mother, upon seeing her newborn
baby in February 1911, had said faintly: Ί think he's perfectly wonder-
ful' (Reagan 1965: 3). Down further on the same page, he writes: 'It
was not until thirty years later that I found part of my existence was
missing.' Credibly portraying someone who was no longer complete,
someone who had lost part of himself, presented Reagan 'with the
most challenging acting problem in ... [his] career' (Reagan 1965: 4).
Yet, what is this self if it is possible to lose part of it without losing
oneself? This question is answered later on in the movie. Drake's wife,
Randy, and his friend Perry carefully kept it a secret from him that he
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Plate 3. Drake:' Where did Gordon think I live, in my legs? Did he think those things were Drake
McHugh?' Randy: 'He wanted to destroy the Drake McHugh you were.' Taken from the movie
King's Row (USA 1941, director: Samuel Wood; photograph: Stiftung Deutsche Kinemathek,
Berlin)
had become the victim of a crime. They thought this discovery would
kill him. One day, however, as Drake threatened to fall into a deep
depression, Perry, who was a psychoanalyst, changed his mind. He
believed that, in the long run, his friend could only be helped by hearing
the truth. If Drake was still entirely himself, then he would be able to
cope with this terrible reality.
After hearing Perry's horrible news, Drake underwent an amazing
change of attitude. Gradually, he smiled and then said contemptuously:
'Where did Gordon think I live, in my legs? Did he think those things
were Drake McHugh?' (see Plate 3).
Drake's condition improved from the moment that he ceased to equate
his body with his self and a part of his body with a part of his self: Ί lost
my legs, okay, but now I've found myself again,' he says contemplatively,
Tm still myself as much as ever.' Triumphantly, he continues: 'The old
Drake is there again. Where's the rest of me? There is no rest of me. I'm
as perfect as I ever was.'
Soon the question of his self-completeness was to preoccupy Ronald
Reagan not only in his virtual life but in his social and personal lives
as well. People did not want to take Reagan, the actor, seriously as
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a politician. Reagan (1965: 6) explains: 'So much of. . . [the actor's]
profession is taken up with pretending ... .' This leads people to say of
him: 'He is only an actor.' That is, 'he is much like I was in King's Row,
only half a man' (1965: 6). And Reagan agrees with them. He, himself,
felt at times Ί had become a semi-automaton "creating" a character
another had written, doing what still another person told me to do on
the set' (1965: 6). Therefore, as he became involved in politics, Reagan
had to develop a strategy to deal with the accusation: 'If you're an
actor, the only thing you can do is act. ... that's all you can do: pretend'
(Reagan 1990: 151). He had to invalidate the suspicion that he only
'memorizes speeches written by other people, just like he memorized
the lines that were fed to him by his screenwriters in the movies'
(1990: 151).
Reagan was able to find a way out of his predicament that was as
simple as it was effective: he tried to present himself as he was. At
the beginning of his political career, Reagan reduced his speeches to
a few introductory words and then held a question-and-answer session
directly with the audience (Reagan 1990: 151). In order to show who he
was, he had to react immediately and be quick-witted. He did this by
acquiring a supply of jokes that could be used flexibly and by telling
stories from his own life. The content of his message was not very
important. Nor did its delivery have to be especially refined. Important
was that the performer appeared to be true to himself in the various
contexts, i.e., that the content of his message remained constant. In
politics, it was never his own impression but rather that of the audience
that determined whether his performance was a success or a failure. And
this determined which aspects of his behavior he developed further.
Thus, the audience determined Reagan's self. Like a leitmotif, this
experience recurs throughout the autobiography.
Reagan describes events from his youth to document with gratitude
how others have made him what he is (see Plate 4). He writes that his
mother 'had the conviction that everyone loved her just because she
loved them' (Reagan 1965: 9). This notion rubbed off on Ronnie, as he
was called then.
That Ronnie started and succeeded at acting can also be attributed
to others. When he was nine years old, his parents moved with him
and his older brother to the small country town Dixon. There, his
mother joined a group that staged recitals of plays and other literary
works. Reagan (1990: 35) remembers:
One day she helped me memorize a short speech and tried to persuade me to
present it that evening at a reading, but I resisted. My brother had already given
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Plate 4. Reagan, the actor, with his parents (Reagan 1990: Fig. 5)
several and had been a hit; in fact, he could sing or dance with the best of 'em
and a lot of people in Dixon thought he'd end up in show business. But I was
more shy and told my mother I didn't want to do it. Yet I guess there was
something competitive enough in me that made me want to try to do as well as
my brother and I finally agreed. Summoning up my courage, I walked up to
the stage that night, cleared my throat, and made my theatrical debut. I don't
remember what I said, but I'll never forget the response: People laughed and
applauded. That was a new experience for me and I liked it. I liked that
approval. For a kid suffering childhood pangs of insecurity, the applause was
music. I didn't know it then, but, in a way, when I walked off the stage that
night, my life had changed.
Reagan reports many other such critical events in his life, and all show how
much other people's opinions influenced his own opinion of himself. At
college, he was a member of the drama society. Reagan (1990: 58) describes
the group's delight when it placed second in a competition that took place
at another university:
while we were relishing this success, it was announced I was one of three perfor-
mers who had been selected to receive individual acting awards. Afterward, the
sponsor of the contest called me into his office and inquired if I'd ever thought
about making acting my career. I said, 'Well, no,' and he said, 'Well, you should'.
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Reagan comments:
I guess that was the day the acting bug really bit me, although I think it was
probably orbiting pretty close to me for a long time before that.
There are, however, some disadvantages to being dependent on other
people's opinions. For example, Reagan repeatedly ran into trouble
as a radio announcer. He writes (Reagan 1965: 56):
The secret of announcing is to make reading sound like talking. I still am not
good at a first reading of a script. At that time I was plain awful. I knew it, and
so did the listeners. What was worse, so did the sponsors. I couldn't give it
that easy conversational persuasive sell.
The constant refraction of self-perception through the perception of
others will remain my topic. It comes to a point with the question: to
what extent is a person that which the others consider him/her to be?
The types of selves
Let us now try to answer the questions regarding the self and self-
presentation by embedding them in semiotic theorization. These
questions then become: How much of the self depends on self-presentation?
What type of sign process is self-presentation?
In order to answer these questions, we need to first examine a series of
notions of self. I will explain these using examples from young Reagan's
life (and allow myself to expand on his biography a bit).
The personality (the self in the narrow sense)
Let us consider the Reagan family. The father, who was constantly
looking for work, had to once again move with his family to another
town. In this unfamiliar town, young Ronnie was placed in a second
grade class with a teacher who did not know him. The teacher wanted
to see how well he could write his name. Ronnie wrote 'Ronald' in his
best handwriting on the board. The teacher saw this and said in front
of the whole class: 'You are a fine writer.'
This one action / (the act of writing finely) of the student b prompts
the teacher a to attribute a characteristic F (fine writer) to b.
(la) T(bJ)
[b performs fine writing]
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(Ib) F(b)
[b is a fine writer]
In this manner, being a fine writer attains the status of a permanent
feature, a personality trait. The teacher construes Ronnie's self as
the set {...} of such personality traits P. Accordingly, let us take
the 'personality' of the person b to be the set of fe's personality
traits:
(SI) {P\P(b)}
[the set of all P for which P(b) is true]
During the Enlightenment, psychologists considered the self to be a
personality in this sense. This notion served as a theoretical basis for
the theatrical work of authors such as Friedrich Schiller. As is well
known, Schiller studied the criminology of his time. He wrote his own
pieces according to the principle that the audience should infer the
offender's character from his/her actions. In his fifth 'Brief über die
Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen' ('Letter on the aesthetic education
of man') Schiller maintains (1962 [1795]: 580): 'People portray themselves
through their actions'. In order to treat one another fittingly, we all try to
attribute lasting characteristics to each other in the form of personality
traits; these attributions are made on the basis of behavior observed on
only a few occasions.
The self-concept (the self-conceived self)
The teacher was a figure of authority to young Ronnie. Through the
teacher's praise, Ronnie felt himself approved of and came to think of
himself as a fine writer. Whenever he wrote something on the blackboard,
he wrote it as finely as he could:
(2a) T(bJ)
[b does/]
because he believed, that he was a fine writer:
(2b) G(b,F(b))
[b believes that b is an F]
Being able to produce fine writing was now a part of &'s self-concept,
part of what he believed himself to be.
Accordingly, we define &'s 'self-conceived self to be the set of
all permanent features P which b believes to be his personality
traits:
(S2) [P\G(b9 P(b))}
[the set of all P of which
b believes that P(b) is true]
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In attribution psychology, the self-conceived self is termed 'self-concept'
and is a notion used in studying the self (see Gergen 1971; Epstein 1979;
Mummendey 1990).
The image (the other-conceived self)
The ability that the teacher discovered in Ronnie gave him several
advantages: when it came time to write sentences on the board, the teacher
gladly called on Ronnie and the other students gave Ronnie precedence.
They did this because they believed that Ronnie could do the job best.
They considered him to be a fine writer:
(3) G(a, F(b))
[a believes that b is an F]
Ronnie's classmates had a certain idea about him. Fine writing was part
of their image of him.
In contrast to the 'self-conceived self,' let us call this image Z?'s Other-
conceived self.' It is defined as the set of permanent features P which
the others a believe to be Z?'s personality traits:
(S3) [P\G(a9 P(b))}
[the set of all P of which
a believes that P(b) is true]
William James (1890) called a person's other-conceived self the 'social
self, and George Herbert Mead analyzed it as such in extensive pub-
lications (1934 and 1964).
The self-wish (the self-intended self)
Despite all of the advantages, after a while Ronnie felt that his roles as
a fine writer and the teacher's pet were too limited. He wanted to prove
himself a success outside of the classroom, too. Thus, he tried to become
a good swimmer.
(4) I(b, F(b»
[b wants b to be an F]
He did not find this difficult, either. He would often jump into the river
and swim against the current. He swam under water and was pleased that
he could hold his breath over increasingly long distances.
The wish to be a good swimmer is an example of what we call a 'self-
intended self.' In contrast to the 'self-conceived self,' we define fe's
'self-intended self as the set of permanent features P that b wishes to
have as personality traits.
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(S4) {P\I(b, P(b))}
[the set of all P for which
b wants P(b) to be true]
Many of the features which make up a person's self-intended self (S4)
can be made features of the personality, i.e., of the self in the narrow
sense (SI), by 'working on one's self.
The other-wish (the other-intended self)
Ronnie's classmates also desired certain things of him. They wanted
him to play with them after school without getting angry if he lost. They
wished that Ronnie were a fair player.
(5) /(a, F(b))
[a wants b to be an F]
Since this was still difficult for Ronnie, he had a hard time in his class.
The others' desire that a person possess a certain personality trait is part
of what we call this person's Other-intended self. In contrast to the 'self-
intended self, we define the Other-intended self as the set of permanent
features P that the others a would like b to have as personality traits:
(S5) (P\I(a, P(b))}
[the set of all P for which
a wants P(b) to be true]
The image-concept (the self-conceived other-conceived self)
If we compare what Ronnie was (his self in the narrow sense, SI) with
what he believed himself to be (his self-conceived self S2), what he wanted
to be (his self-intended self S4), what the others believed Ronnie to be
(his other-conceived self S3), and what they wanted him to be (his other-
intended self S5), there are many possibilities for concurrence and differ-
ence. There are no problems if what a person is is the same as what the
others believe and want him/her to be. However, this is rarely the case
for all personality traits, which Ronnie, too, came to experience. He
considered himself to be a good football player:
(6a) G(b, F(b))
[b believes that b is an F]
When it came time to choose players for the class team, however, Ronnie's
fellow students preferred others to him:
(6b) G(<z, -n/ty))
[a believes that b is not an F]
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Ronnie came to realize that his classmates' image of him as a football
player did not correspond with his image of himself:
(6c) G(b, G(a, ^F(0)))
[b believes that a believes that
b is not an F]
In situations such as this, Ronnie constructed his own concept of the
others' concept of himself. That is, he constructed his self-conceived
other-conceived self. In other words, he thought about his classmates'
image of himself and developed a certain image-concept. 'It has taken
me many years to get used to seeing myself as others see me ...,' Reagan
later wrote in his autobiography (1965: 79).
We define fe's 'self-conceived other-conceived self as the set of
permanent features P of which b believes that the others a think that
they are £'s personality traits, i.e., which b believes to belong to his
other-conceived self:
(S6) {P\G(b9 G(a, />(£)))}
[the set of all P such that b believes that
a believes that P(b) is true]
The self-conceived other-conceived self is what the psychiatrist Ronald
Laing (see Laing 1960 and in particular Laing, Phillipson, and Lee 1966:
part I, chs. 2 and 3) called the 'meta-image' of a person. A person's meta-
image (image-concept) can differ from his/her image (other-conceived
self) as well as from his/her self-concept and personality traits (self in the
narrow sense). Ronnie was, in fact, an average football player, but at
times he considered himself to be a football genius; and sometimes he
thought that the others regarded him as a failure, whereas they actually
considered him to be just average.
The image-wish (the self-intended other-conceived self)
What could a schoolboy like Ronnie do to improve his image as
a football player? He practiced diligently and took advantage of
every opportunity he got to play football well in front of the
others.
(7a) T(bJ}
[b plays good football]
He did this with the intention of creating situations which would lead
the others to believe that he was a good football player:
(7b) J(b, E(f) -> G(a, F(b»)
[b wants playing good football to cause a to believe that
b is a good football player]
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Whoever behaves in this manner is trying to fulfill an image-wish. Tech-
nically speaking, what is meant here is a self-wish for an other-conceived
concept of one's self, i.e., a self-intended other-conceived self.
A person's 'self-intended other-conceived self is defined as the set of
permanent features P of which b wants the others a to believe that they are
Z?'s personality traits (i.e., which b wants to be part of his other-conceived
self):
(S7) {P\I(b, G(a, P(b)))}
[the set of all P such that b wants
a to believe that P(b) is true]
However, tending to one's image in this way carries the risk that the
opposite of the intended effect is achieved: the others consider one to be
a show-off rather than a good football player.
The image-wish image (the other-conceived self-intended
other-conceived self)
The Ronnie of old actually did exaggerate his image-correction efforts.
He not only wanted to be an exemplary swimmer, he also wanted to be
regarded as a good football player. That he continuously tried to bring
this about bothered his classmates. They developed a concept of his desire
to show off, i.e., an other-conceived concept of his image-wish emerged.
Playing good football in so obtrusive a manner not only caused his
classmates to believe that he was a good football player, as was intended:
(8a) E(f) -> G(a, F(b))
[playing good football causes a to believe that
b is a good football player]
It also caused his classmates to believe that Ronnie wanted them to
believe that he was a good football player, which was not intended:
(8b) E(f) -> G(a, 7(6, G(a, F(6))))
[playing good football causes a to believe that
b wants a to believe that
b is a good football player]
In this manner, Ronnie became a braggart. His positive personality
traits paled in the light of the supposition that he developed these traits
only to show them off to the others. A supposition such as this is an
example of an image-wish image. Technically speaking, it is what we call
an Other-conceived self-intended other-conceived self:
(S8) (P\G(a, I(b, G(a, P(6))))}
[the set of all P such that a believes that
b wants a to believe that P(b) is true]
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Plate 5. Reagan posing as a football player for a sculpturing class at the University of Southern
California (photograph: Friedman 1986: 37). The movie company Warner Brothers marketed
Reagan in this way as the 'Twentieth-Century Adonis'having 'the most nearly perfect male figure
in Hollywood'
Being considered a show-off is not a good image, and Ronnie knew
how to counter this. Which notion of self this would entail is now left to the
reader to determine.
Plate 5 illustrates yet another notion of self: the Other-intended other-
conceived self. The production company Warner Brothers wanted the
public to believe that Reagan was a Twentieth Century Adonis'.
The stratified total-self
Theoretically, this exposition of 'self notions could continue indefinitely.
I would like to stop here, however, in order to summarize the definitions of
the self which have been introduced thus far:
SI: the self in the narrow sense
S2: the self-conceived self
S3: the other-conceived self
S4: the self-intended self
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S5: the other-intended self
S6: the self-conceived other-conceived self
S7: the self-intended other-conceived self
S8: the other-conceived self-intended other-conceived self.
On comparing these definitions, we realize that each type of self contains
a set of features P which are ascribed to a person b either directly or by
way of belief or intention. In the formulas (SI) through (S8), G(..., ...)
stands for 'believe' and /(..., ...), for 'intend'. In the examples, the
verbs thinks, assumes, regards, and considers were sometimes substituted
for 'believes', and 'intends' was occasionally replaced by wants, desires, and
wishes. The extent to which an ascribed feature is embedded in belief and
intention can be increased at will. As shown by the examples, it depends
on the complexity of the situation that has to be managed by the person
and the others concerned. (A systematic list of all 'self notions involved
can be found in Posner 1996.)
As a result, an open set of selves of arbitrary complexity can be
constructed. Every person has several selves. It is the entire set of selves
developed by a person at some time or another that I propose to call
the 'total-self ofthat person (see Fig. 1).
The person £'s maximum total-self can be represented by the formula:
(GS) {P| ... P(b)}
[the set of all P for which ... P(b) is true]
The dots in the formula can be replaced by operator sequences of
optional complexity; the operators are of the type G(..., or /(...,
— their closing parenthesis being placed before the rightmost bracket.
As a result, GS generates the set of Z?'s sub-selves, SI, S2, ... S8, etc.
Every total-self can be organized as in Figure 1 by assigning the
sub-selves to different levels of reflection. The structure by which the
personality-trait formulas are embedded in formulas of belief and
intention serves as the assignment criterion.
A state of affairs which does not include believing or intending is
assigned to the reflection level RSO. The self in the narrow sense, SI, is
a set of features of this type: (P\P(b)}. SI, thus, belongs to reflection
level RSO.
A state of affairs which consists in believing or intending a state of
affairs on RSO is assigned to the reflection level RSI. The self-conceived
self, S2, is a set of features on level RSO which the person believes to
be his/her own: [P\G(b, P(b))}. The other-conceived self, S3, is a set
of features on level RSO which the others believe to be features of
the person concerned: [P\G(a, P(b))}. The self-intended self, S4, is a
set of features on level RSO which the person concerned intends
to possess: (P\I(b, P(b))}. The other-intended self, S5, is a set of
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Figure l. The stratified total-self with its sub-selves at the reflection levels RSO, RSI, RS2, etc.
features on RSO which others intend b to have: {P\I(a, P(b))}.
Thus, the selves S2 through S5 belong to reflection level RSI. This
is made clear by the structure of the expressions to the right of the
vertical slashes.
A state of affairs which consists in believing or intending a state of
affairs on level RSI is assigned to the reflection level RS2. The self-
conceived other-conceived self, S6, is a set of features on RSI which
the person concerned believes to be true: {P\G(b, G(a, P(b)))}. The
self-intended other-conceived self, S7, is a set of features on level RSI
which are intended by b: {P\I(b, G(a, P(b)}}}. Thus, the selves S6 and
S7 belong to reflection level RS2. Further selves on this reflection
level are shown in Figure 1.
The other-conceived self-intended other-conceived self, S8, is a
set of features on level RS2 which the others believe to be true:
{P\G(a, I(b, G(a, />(£))))}. S8, thus, belongs to reflection level RS3.
We call a total-self that has been divided into the different levels of
reflection, as was done here, a 'stratified total-self. As shown by the
examples taken from young Reagan's life, during self-presentation, a
person is less focussed on his/her total-self than on a specific sub-self.
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The 'self notions discussed here identify what is actually being pre-
sented when a person tries to present him/herself. This answers our first
question, allowing us to now turn to the possible kinds of presentation
so that we can then determine what may be regarded as self-presentation.
Kinds of presentation
In discussing the types of selves, I have used configurations of the
notions of 'feature', 'intending', and 'believing'. These same notions can
be used to answer questions regarding the process we call 'presentation'.
Each presentation is a sign process, and whoever produces signs does
something with the intention that it cause others to believe something.
Self-presentation, then, occurs when that which the others are to believe
concerns a self-feature of the person who would have them believe it.
By making use of the notions of 'believing' and 'intending', as well as
the notion of causality ('causing'), we can not only explain the types of
selves but also the structure of the sign processes involved. Given this
foundation, it is even possible to systematize all conceivable types of
sign processes (see Posner 1993 and 1995).
In the current context, our task is to outline the types of sign pro-
cesses only insofar as they underlie the various kinds of presentation.
With this goal in mind, we return to the small country town of Dixon,
where Ronald Reagan spent part of his youth, and try to look at it from
his perspective.
The indicator
In Dixon there was an area where weekend houses stood that were
usually vacant during the week. Ronnie liked to wander around there.
While looking at one of the houses, he noticed that a window was
open. This led him to believe that the house was occupied:
(Dl) £(/)-» <7(fl,/0
[The occurrence of/causes
a to believe that p]
In that the opened state of the window suggested to him that the house
was occupied, it became an indicator for Ronnie. We are dealing here
with what is called an 'indicator process'. Indicators are circumstances
which cause a person to assume a certain state of affairs to exist. We call
the person affected by the indicator a 'recipient'. That which is believed
is called the 'message'. Indicators require neither that the believed
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message is true nor that a person (a sender) exists who intends to cause
this belief.
The indicator production
As Ronnie was wandering in the area again, an attic window of one of
the houses opened. Ronnie noticed the window opening. This led him
to believe that the house was occupied. This time, there was a person b
who produced the circumstance which caused another person to assume
a certain state of affairs to exist:
(D2) IK*,/) Λ
[b does/, and the occurrence of /causes
a to believe that p]
The opening of the window is an indicator in the sense of (Dl).
Causing an indicator such as this to occur is called 'indicator production'.
In producing this indicator, the person who opened the window did not
have to know that someone else was observing this action. Nor did s/he
have to intend that observers draw conclusions from this action. Indicator
production can be done unintentionally.
Indicating
Ronnie liked it when his classmates dropped by his house to play with
him. When he was in his bedroom, he would open his window to let
his friends know that he was there before they set foot on the property
(see Plate 6).
By opening the window, Ronnie intended to cause his friends to
assume that he was in his bedroom:
(D3) 7X6,/) Λ
I(b9E(f)->G(a,p))
[b does / and b intends that
the occurrence of/causes a to believe that;?]
In this case, opening the window is not just the unintentional produc-
tion of an indicator. It is done with the intention that a recipient infer
a certain message from it. We call a sign process of this sort 'indicating'.
It is not necessary that the resulting message be true: there were times
when Ronnie forgot to open his window although he was in his bed-
room; there were other times when Ronnie's mother opened the bedroom
window while Ronnie was gone.
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Plate 6. The Reagan family's house in Dixon (Reagan 1990: Fig. 2)
The expression
If a recipient interprets a circumstance as an indicator that its producer
is in a certain state (i.e., a physical, emotional, mental, or social condi-
tion or disposition), we call the circumstance an 'expression' of that
state. Ronnie's mother assigned him a flower bed in the yard to tend to.
She interpreted the fact that the flower bed was always well watered
as an expression of Ronnie's conscientiousness:
(D4) £(/) -» G(a, Z(b}}
[The occurrence of/causes
a to believe that b is in the state Z]
That someone takes a circumstance to be an expression of its assumed
producer's state necessitates neither that the circumstance was actually
produced by the assumed person, nor that this person is in the assumed
state.
The expression production
Even if Ronnie did regularly water the flower bed, he did not have to do it
with the intention of causing his mother to regard him as conscientious.
People can act conscientiously without thinking and without wanting
to display it to others. In such cases, a person produces a circumstance
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which the others take to be an expression of his/her state, but s/he does
this unintentionally:
(D5) Γ(6,/)Λ
£(/) -+ G(a, Z(b))
[b does/, and the occurrence of/causes
a to believe that b is in the state Z]
We call making an expression in this manner 'expression production'.
Expressing
Ronnie liked being thought of as conscientious since it brought him
praise and appreciation. Therefore, he actually did water the flowers
with the intention that it cause his mother to believe that he was
conscientious:
(D6) 7X6,/) Λ
7(6, E(f) -> G(a, Z(6)))
[b does / and b intends that
the occurrence of/causes a to believe that
b is in the state Z]
We call producing a circumstance with the intention of causing a recipient
to assume that its producer is in a certain state 'expressing'. Through this
action, the producer expresses his/her state.
Comparing these six types of sign-processes, Dl through D6, we realize
that we are dealing with six different kinds of presentation:
In the rudimentary indicator process, Dl, nobody has to present
anything. Therefore, we can say, at best: 'the house presented itself to
the recipient as being occupied'.
In the indicator production, D2, there is someone who presents a
certain state of affairs through his/her actions: an inhabitant presents
the house to the recipient as being occupied. But this can happen
unintentionally.
Not until the act of indicating, D3, do we have presentation in the
narrow sense. Ronnie intentionally presents his room to his friends as
being occupied.
The verb 'to present' can be used in all three cases. Only in the case
of D3, however, do we speak of 'presentation in the narrow sense', i.e.,
a process of producing a circumstance with the intention that others
interpret it as an indicator of a certain state of affairs.
The sign processes D4 through D6 are special types of presentation
in that their message concerns the state of a real or assumed indicator
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producer. In these cases, we speak of 'expression'. In the rudimentary
expression process, D4, nobody has to express anything. We can say
'the flower bed expresses conscientiousness' without knowing if some-
one regularly tends to it or if this person wants the flower bed to express
something of the kind.
In the expression production, D5, someone actually does express his/
her own state of being through actions: by watering the flower bed
regularly, Ronnie expresses his conscientiousness. However, this can be
done unintentionally.
It is not until the act of expressing, D6, that we have expression in
the narrow sense: Ronnie waters the flowers regularly as an expression
of his conscientiousness. We can speak of an 'expression in the narrow
sense' when someone does something with the intention that others take
it as an indicator of the state s/he is in.
Types of self-presentation
We can now ask which of the kinds of presentation discussed can be
conceived as self-presentation. In answering this question, it makes
sense to proceed from the expression production (D5) and the act of
expressing (D6). Both cases have to do with presentation, and in both
cases the presenter's state is presented. If we consider the 'self notions
which we discussed in the second section ('The types of selves'), then the
following question becomes obvious: how does the indicator producer
6's state Z, which is postulated in the expression processes, compare to
the personality trait />, which we assumed in the analysis of the self?
The answer is simple: a person's state can change, but a person's per-
sonality traits are considered to be permanent parts of his/her self.
The appeal of a new activity may prompt Ronnie to water the flowers
conscientiously for two weeks, after which he could lose interest. Con-
scientiousness is only regarded as one of Ronnie's personality traits if
it persists over a longer period of time. (One would also expect that it
not be limited to the act of watering the flowers.)
In this manner, we arrive at the assumption that self-presentation in
the narrow sense takes place when a person does something with the
intention that this action cause others to infer that a certain permanent
feature (self-trait) is part ofthat person's self. This self-trait can be either: a
personality trait as such, indicated by P(b)\ or a self-conceived, other-
conceived, self-wished, other-wished, etc. personality trait, indicated
by ... P(b) in the formula (SDM).
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[b does /, and b intends that
the occurrence of /causes
a to believe that ... bis a. P]
Self-presentation in the narrow sense has the structure given in (SDM);
it is an act of expressing through which the presenter expresses a self-
trait. Aside from the dots, the formula (SDM) differs from the formula
for the act of expressing, D6, only in that Z is replaced by P.
In the same way, self-presentation in a broader sense can be obtained
from the formula for expression production, D5, by replacing Z with P:
(SDM') Γ
[b does/, and the occurrence of /causes
a to believe that . . . b is a P]
Both self-presentation in the narrow and in the broader sense may
result in the receiver's attributing a certain self-trait to the presenter.
However, while this is the intended result of self-presentation in the
narrow sense, self-presentation in the broader sense may have this
consequence without the presenter intending it.
The two formulas, (SDM) and (SDM'), leave a great deal undeter-
mined. For this reason, we call each a 'self-presentation matrix'. The
dots in the matrix leave room for the structures which appear when
we take into consideration the eight types of selves, SI through S8,
discussed in the second section ('The types of selves'). The formulas
(SI) through (S8) define each type of self as a set {...} of self-traits which
are either: personality traits as such, as in (SI); or self-conceived, self-
wished, other-conceived, other-wished, etc. personality traits mediated
by belief or intention, as in (S2), (S3), .... To obtain self-presentation
formulas that correspond to each type of self, we insert into the self-
presentation matrix the logical components of the set-theoretical
formulas (SI) through (S8), i.e., those components to the right of the
vertical slash. As a result, we obtain the following formulas.
Self-presentation in the narrow sense (presentation of the personality)
This formula characterizes the simplest case of self-presentation. Only
P(b) appears in the scope of G(#, ...). The formula is obtained from
the matrix formula (SDM) simply by omitting the dots (...):
(SD1) Γ(
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[b does /, and b intends that
the occurrence of/causes a to believe that
P(b) is true]
Self-presentation in the narrow sense consists in a person demonstrating
directly to others a certain personality trait. After getting over some
initial difficulties, young Reagan presented himself to his classmates as
a football whiz by playing good football. If he did this unintentionally,
then the formula is to be based on the matrix (SDM') rather than on
(SDM).
Self-concept presentation (presentation of the self-conceived self)
In the corresponding formula, G(b, P(bJ) appears in the scope of G(a, ...).
The formula is obtained by replacing the dots in the matrix formula (SDM)
with G(b, and suitably closing the parenthesis:
(SD2) Γ(£,/)Λ
7(6, E(f) -> G(a, (?(*, P(bW
[b does/, and b intends that
the occurrence of/causes a to believe that
b thinks that P(b) is true]
The presentation of a person's self-conceived self consists in a person
behaviorally expressing to others his/her opinion of him/herself regarding
a possible personality trait. Through his rugged performance during
the try-out for the class team, Ronnie presented himself as someone
who considers himself to be a pro at football. If he did this uninten-
tionally, then (SDM') must be used as the basis of the formula rather
than (SDM).
Image presentation (presentation of the other-conceived self )
In the corresponding formula, G(a, P(b)) appears in the scope of
G(<2, ...). The formula is based on the matrix formula (SDM) and is
arrived at by replacing the dots in (SDM) with G(a, and suitably closing the
parenthesis:
(SD3) 7Χ
[b does/ and b intends that
the occurrence of /causes a to believe that
a believes that P(b) is true]
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The presentation of a person's other-conceived self consists in a person b
calling through his/her behavior other people's attention to their own
opinion of b. By running to the board whenever the teacher wanted
something written nicely, Ronnie presented himself to his classmates as
a 'fine writer on active duty', i.e., as one whom the others deemed a fine
writer. If he did this unintentionally, then (SMD') must be used as the
basis for the formula.
Self-wish presentation (presentation of the self-intended self)
In this formula, /(£, P(b)) appears in the scope of G(a, ...). The
formula is obtained by replacing the dots in the matrix formula
(SDM) with /(&, and suitably closing the parenthesis:
(SD4) T(b,f)/\
7(6, E(f) -* G(a, I(b, P(bm
[b does /, and b intends that
the occurrence of/causes a to believe that
b wants P(b) to be true]
The presentation of a person's self-intended self consists in the person
behaviorally expressing to others that s/he is striving to acquire a certain
personality trait. By practicing diligently, Ronnie presented himself to
his parents as one who would like to be a good football player. If this
outcome was unintentional, then (SDM') must be used as the basis for
the formula.
Other-wish presentation (presentation of the other-intended self)
In this formula, /(#, P(b)) appears in the scope of G(a, ...). It is
arrived at by replacing the dots in the matrix formula (SDM) with 7(a,
and suitably closing the parenthesis:
(SD5) Γ(£,/)Λ
7(6, E(f) -» G(a, I(a, P(b))))
[b does /, and b intends that
the occurrence of/causes a to believe that
a wants P(b) to be true]
The presentation of a person's other-intended self consists in a person b
pointing out to other people his/her own desire that b possess a certain
personality trait. Ronnie sometimes misbehaved during card games. In
doing so, he presented himself to his playmates as someone who should
play fair, i.e., as someone of whom the playmates demanded fairness.
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If he did this unintentionally, then the formula must be based on (SDM')
rather than on (SDM).
Image-concept presentation (presentation of the self-conceived
other-conceived self)
In the corresponding formula, G(b, G(a, P(b))) appears in the scope of
G(a, ...)· The formula is obtained by replacing the dots in the matrix
formula (SDM) with G(b, G(a, and suitably closing the parenthesis:
(SD6) 7X6,/) Λ
7(6, E(f) -> G(a, G(6, G(a, P(6)))))
[b does /, and b intends that
the occurrence of/causes a to believe that
b believes that a believes that P(b) is true]
The presentation of a person's self-conceived other-conceived self con-
sists in a person behaviorally making clear to others that s/he believes
that they have a certain opinion of him/her. Ronnie occasionally feigned
modesty when cast for the main role of a play. In doing so, he presented
himself as someone who believed that the others considered him a top
actor, one who could, therefore, afford to simulate being a modest per-
son. If this result was unintentional, then (SDM') must replace (SDM)
as the basis for the formula.
Image-wish presentation (presentation of the self-intended
other-conceived self)
In the corresponding formula, 7(6, G(a, P(6))) appears in the scope
of G(a, ...). It is arrived at by replacing the dots in the matrix formula
(SDM) with 7(6, G(a, and suitably closing the parenthesis:
(SD7) 7X6,/) Λ
7(6, E(f) -> G(a, 7(6, G(a, P(6)))))
[b does /, and b intends that
the occurrence of/causes a to believe that
b wants a to believe that P(b) is true]
The presentation of a person's self-intended other-conceived self consists
in a person making clear to others through behavior that s/he would like
it if they had a certain opinion of him/her. Every chance he got, Ronnie
invited his friends to a self-prepared meal. In doing so, he presented him-
self as someone who would like to have the reputation of being a good
cook. If he did this unintentionally, then the formula must be based on
(SDM') rather than on (SDM).
Bereitgestellt von | Technische Universität Berlin
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 11.10.18 15:42
470 R. Posner
Image-wish-image presentation (presentation of the other-conceived
self-intended other-conceived self)
In the corresponding formula, G(a, I(b, G(a, P(b)))) appears in the scope of
G(a, ...). It is obtained by replacing the dots in the matrix formula (SDM)
with G(a, I(b, G(a, and suitably closing the parenthesis:
(SD8) Γ(Ζ>,/)Λ
/(&, E(f) -> G(a, G(a9 7(6, G(a, />(£))))))
[b does /, and b intends that
the occurrence of/causes a to believe that
a believes that b wants a to believe that
P(b) is true]
The presentation of a person's other-conceived self-intended other-
conceived self consists in a person behaviorally pointing out to others
that they think that s/he wants them to have a certain opinion of him/
her. For a while, Ronnie overdid the exhibition of his cooking talents.
This made the others aware not only that he wanted to be regarded as a
good cook, but also that they themselves believed that he wanted to be
regarded as such. That is, he rubbed their noses in the fact that they
considered him to be a show-off. This led to much teasing of him on
their part. If Ronnie behaved in this manner unintentionally, then
(SMD') must serve as the basis for the formula rather than (SDM).
The formulas (SD1) through (SD8) describe common types of self-
presentation. Further self-presentation formulas can be constructed by
making other types of selves (see Fig. 1) the object of expressing.
Self-development through illusion and simulation
As the previous section shows, the structures of self-presentation can
be quite complex. Important, however, is the observation that they
are all made up of the same components: personality traits and doing,
intending, believing, and causing. As mentioned in the discussion of the
self-conceived other-conceived self (in the second section), a person need
not actually have the personality trait that s/he believes s/he possesses
(self-conceived self), or desires to possess (self-intended self), or that
others believe (other-conceived self) or desire (other-intended self) him/
her to possess. If the person does not have this personality trait, i.e.,
if -*P(b) is true, then we are dealing with a virtual personality trait.
The same holds for the others' assumptions of and wishes for virtual
personality traits: a person can believe (self-conceived other-conceived
self) or desire (self-intended other-conceived self) that the others have
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a certain opinion of him/her; a person can also believe (self-conceived
other-intended self) or desire (self-intended other-intended self) that
the others want him/her to possess a certain personality trait. However,
it can at the same time be true that the others do not actually believe
or wish these things. In cases such as this, we are dealing with virtual
other-concepts and other-wishes.
This is also true for the person's assumptions of and wishes for
virtual personality traits: the others can believe (other-conceived self-
conceived self) or wish (other-intended other-conceived self) that a per-
son believes that s/he possesses a certain personality trait; the others can
also believe (other-conceived self-intended self) or wish (other-intended
self-intended self) that a person wants to possess a certain personality
trait. All of this can be true, however, even if the person does not actu-
ally assume or desire to possess this trait. In this case, we are dealing
with virtual self-concepts and self-wishes.
We speak of 'illusion' when one assumes the existence of personality
traits, self-concepts, self-wishes, other-concepts, or other-wishes when
in fact they are only virtual. Similarly, we speak of 'simulation' when
one presents oneself as possessing personality traits, self-concepts, self-
wishes, other-concepts, or other-wishes although they are only virtual.
Thus, here as well as elsewhere, simulation consists in the creation of
an illusion. The question now arises as to what role virtual personality
traits, self-concepts, self-wishes, other-concepts, or other-wishes play
in self-presentation. The key question is: is self-presentation possible
without illusion and simulation?
This Question is particularly relevant in relation to the process by
which a child (like young Reagan) develops his or her self. If we orient
ourselves on the structure of the stratified total-self (see Fig. 1), then
it would seem obvious that: Ronnie began by developing certain per-
sonality traits, P(b)\ then he developed the respective self-concept,
G(b, P(b))i finally, after interacting with others, he developed the
corresponding self-concept of their other-concept of his personality,
G(b, G(a, P(b)J), etc. Given this course of development, the personality
trait would exist first and would then be perceived with a continually
growing awareness. The development would start with the self in the
narrow sense at the level of reflection RSO and would slowly climb to
higher levels of reflection in concurrence with the traits on the level RSO.
However, self-development does not always follow this course. This
becomes quite clear when we consider the self-wishes and the other-
wishes: these tend to occur, when the respective personality trait does
not (yet) exist: ->P(b). Therefore, there must be constellations in which
the personality trait concerned does not exist at the bottom reflection
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level (RSO) and at the same time is attributed at higher reflection levels,
i.e., 7(6, P(b)) as with self-wishes or I(a, P(b)) as with other-wishes. This
holds true for physical as well as for mental personality traits: a person
who does not have blond hair and blue eyes could want to be blond-haired
and blue-eyed, and a person who is not good at mathematics could want
tobe.
Now, missing physical personality traits, such as blond hair and
blue eyes, cannot be called into existence by self-wishes or other-wishes.
It is a different matter, however, with dispositions such as compe-
tence in mathematics and other mental personality traits. Here, self-
wishes, other-wishes, and other-concepts are determining factors in the
self-development.
Young Ronnie's (see Plate 7) experiences confirm this impressively:
— Ronnie, who until then had only occasionally written finely, began to
be a fine writer when the teacher formed a corresponding other-concept
and confronted Ronnie with this. Ronnie's assumption that the teacher
considered him a fine writer (and also the advantages to be gained by
being one) prompted him to become one:
(9) G(b, G(a, P(b))) -» P(b)
[that b believes that a believes that b is a P
causes b to be a P]
— Ronnie, who until then was a poor football player, was angry that he
was left on the side-lines when it came time to select the players for the
class team. He wanted to be considered a good football player because
this would, in general, give him clout with his classmates. His desire that the
others consider him a good player caused him gradually to become one:
(10) I(b, G(a, P(b))) -+ P(b)
[that b wants a to believe that b is a P
causes b to be a P]
— Ronnie, who until then had only occasionally memorized and
recited texts, began developing into a good amateur actor when his
mother asked him to perform for her recital club. Ronnie's assumption
that his mother wanted him to be a good amateur actor (as well as the
applause he received from the others) caused Ronnie to become one:
(11) G(b, 7(a, />(£))) -+ P(b)
[that b believes that a wants b to be a P
causes b to be a P]
We can note the following: Manifest physical traits develop, to a great
extent, automatically; one has to learn to accept them. Dispositional
mental traits, however, do not develop on their own. The individual
develops these mental traits once they have been introduced on a
higher level of reflection and have become desirable. Mental personality
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Plate 7. Reagan at the age of 27 (Friedman 1986: 33)
traits are to a great extent dependent upon other-concepts, self-wishes,
and other-wishes. This means that they are socially controlled.
A second observation can be made as we consider the formulas (9)
through (11). A transition takes place as the abilities to write finely,
play football, and act are developed: the self of a higher level of reflec-
tion becomes a self of a lower level of reflection. The level of reflection is
reduced by two levels from RS2 to RSO: because Ronnie believes that
the teacher believes that Ronnie is a fine writer, Ronnie becomes a fine
writer; because Ronnie wants the others to believe that he is a good
football player, he becomes a good football player; because Ronnie
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believes that his mother wants him to be a good amateur actor, Ronnie
becomes a good amateur actor.
The adoption of personality traits by means of level reduction serves
to eliminate inconsistencies within and contradictions between the levels
of the total-self. At first, ~^P(b) occurs at the lowest level of reflection
and .. .P(b) occurs at the higher levels (where P(b) is embedded in sequences
of the operators G(..., ...) or /(..., ...)). By developing the personality trait
P(b), the person establishes inter-level consistency throughout his/her
total-self.
A prime example of this type of situation and how it can be mastered
is offered in the second section (The image-concept'): young Reagan
was actually an average football player, but he considered himself to be a
football genius; at the same time, he thought that his teammates regarded
him as a failure, whereas they only deemed him average. To free himself
from this painful situation, Ronnie practiced so much that he actually
became a good football player. This gave the others reason to regard him
as such, and Ronnie no longer had to believe that their opinion of him
differed from his own. As a result, Ronnie was not just virtually a good
football player by virtue of his self-assessment, but was a good football
player on all the levels of reflection involved.
At least with regard to the mental personality traits, it follows that
a person's self is not an unalterable given. It is socially formed and is
developed proceeding from the virtual personality traits represented at
higher levels of reflection, i.e., by means of illusion and simulation.
Ronnie was not yet a fine writer when the teacher said to him, 'you are a
fine writer': G(a, P(b)) and -*P(b). However, his teacher saying this to him
caused Ronnie to become one; see formula (9). Nor was Ronnie a good
football player when he at first acted like one and wanted his teammates to
regard him as one: /(£, G(a, P(b))) and ->P(£). However, by virtue of his
self-wish he became a good football player; see formula (10). On the day
that Ronnie's mother encouraged him to perform as an amateur actor,
Ronnie was not one yet: /(&, P(b)) and ->P(b). However, due to this other-
wish, Ronnie became an amateur actor; see formula (11). Illusion was at
play every time, and simulation, quite often. The personality traits existed
virtually before becoming reality.
This raises the issue of how reality can originate from simulation. To
answer this question, we must take into account the dialectic of the
individual act and the permanent feature, which I touched on earlier in
the second section (first part). Let us consider this further, using an
example which was essential to Reagan's career transition from actor to
politician. In order to be regarded as a good politician, Reagan had
to avoid making the impression that he was simply reciting speeches
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written by other people (see Ripper 1998: 111 and 115). He had to prove
his autonomy to the citizens by repeatedly voicing his unswerving convic-
tions in a spontaneous manner. How can people learn to be spontaneous?
They have to try to appear spontaneous. Reagan acquired a supply of
stories and jokes and told these whenever it was appropriate. He played
a person who improvised well. Every successful improvisation strength-
ened his reputation as an improviser. Since playing the role of an
improviser consisted in having to constantly improvise anew, Reagan got
so much practice at improvising that he actually became a good impro-
viser. His acting could no longer be distinguished from reality. By means of
frequent simulation, Reagan became the person he was simulating. His self
was not the starting point but rather the result of self-presentation; he
developed his self through self-presentation. It is only in the light of this
that we can understand remarks about Reagan such as those made by
Peggy Noonan, Reagan's speech writer of many years (Noonan 1990:158):
'He really always played himself .... That's why he seemed both phony
and authentic. Because he was. He was really acting but the part he played
was Ronald Reagan'. He appeared phony because he was practicing self-
presentation; he seemed authentic because his means of presentation
were manifestations of the person he portrayed, (cf. Morris 1999; for a
discussion of the problems which develop when an actual actor/actress is
mistaken for the politician s/he portrays, see Posner 1994.)
To demonstrate that this fascinating self-development process can be
fully described by means of our technical concepts, let us represent it
by using the corresponding formulas:
1. The person b wants the others a to attribute to him/her a certain
self-trait F:
(i) /(/>, G(a, F(b)D
[b wants a to believe that b is an F]
2. In Z?'s opinion, this image-wish (self-intended other-conceived self)
can be realized if 6, in all relevant situations i, acts like someone who
is an F, i.e., who does/:
(ii) G(b^tTt(bJ}^G(a,F(b)})
[b believes that if it is true for all t that
b does/in t then this will cause
a to believe that b is an F]
3. Person b's wish that he appear to the others as an F (i) and his belief
that this will happen if he does/in all relevant situations t (ii) cause b to
do/ in all relevant situations:
(iii) MtTt(bJ)
[it is true for all situations t that
b does/in /]
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4. Now it is an analytically true statement that one who does / in
all relevant situations / is an /-doer, i.e., is an F:
(iv) VxVi(r,(x,/)DF(x))
[it is true for all people χ and all situations t that
if χ does /in /, then χ is an F]
5. By substituting b for χ in (iv) and by modus ponens using (iii), we
derive from (iv):
(v) F(b)
[b is an F]
6. In trying to convince a that b is an F by means of doing/ b actually
became an F. The only requirement was that there were enough rele-
vant situations in which b could do / The generalized summary is as
follows:
(vi) Vx Vi (Tt (x, /) Λ /(*, Tt (x, /) -> G(a, F(x)))
[it is true for all people χ and situations t that
if χ does / in t because χ wants
doing /in t to cause a to believe that χ is an F
then this causes χ to be an F]
The formula (vi) describes what I propose to call the 'Reagan Effect'. It
shows the logical structure in which level reduction from .../(.x, ...G(a,
,F(jc))) to F(x) takes place.
For pairs of acts /and personality traits F, for example,
'writing (finely)' '(fine) writer'
'swimming (well)' '(good) swimmer'
'playing football (well)' '(good) football player'
'losing fairly' 'fair person'
'cooking well' 'good cook'
'working conscientiously' 'conscientious worker'
'acting (well)' '(good) actor'
'improvising (well)' '(good) improviser'
'acting intelligent' 'intelligent person'
'presiding' 'President'
concluding the presence of a self-trait on the basis of a few occur-
rences of the corresponding act is always justified under the described
conditions.
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Ultimately, the Reagan Effect explains the fact that, by constantly
presenting a certain self, one becomes this self. This is only possible
due to the fact that our selves are not pre-defined but rather must be
developed.
The Reagan Effect boils down to the fact that an aspired reality
can be brought about by the mental anticipation of it. It is a spe-
cial case of the self-fulfilling prophecy (see Merton 1948; Rosenthal
1968; Ludwig 1991) and is, therefore, to be put in the same category
as these other effects: the Rosenthal Effect, which consists in
the researcher's expectations influencing the test person's behavior;
the Pygmalion Effect, by which the teacher's expectations affect the
student's achievement (see Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968); the Messiah
Effect, by which propagating a prophecy influences the develop-
ment of the prophecy's object (see Eden 1986); the Galatea Effect, by
which fearing an event makes the occurrence of this event more
probable (see Rosenthal 1975); and the placebo effect, which consists
in the belief in an effect evoking that effect (see Kirsch 1985).
In contrast to these types of self-fulfilling prophecies, however, the
Reagan Effect is based on a logically transparent and unchanging
mechanism: the creation of a personality trait through the exhibition
of its manifestation.
The Reagan Effect results in the development of dispositional self-
traits. It cannot be used to produce manifest physical traits; the human
being's possession of two arms, two legs, two eyes, two ears, one nose,
and one mouth are out of its range. But the traits pertaining to the way
in which the body parts move, whether
— awkwardly or smoothly,
— sedately or swiftly
and, most definitely, the traits involving more complex behavioral
patterns, whether
— pedantic or flexible,
— reliable or unreliable,
— obliging or unwieldy,
— friendly or stubborn,
— finicky or easily pleased,
— honest or insidious,
can be acquired by displaying their manifestations. At first, the display
might not be a completely successful one since the displayed trait is in
its earliest stage of development. The presentation takes place before
that which is presented exists. Through presentation, however, the pre-
senter gets enough practice that, eventually, s/he has not only mastered the
art of presentation but also that which s/he is presenting.
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The computer as a self-presenter
Can the results of our analysis of human self-development be applied
to artificial cognitive systems? Can computers develop a self in the same
manner?
With computers, too, it is necessary to differentiate between manifest
physical properties and behavioral dispositions. In the same way that a
human is supplied with arms, legs, eyes, ears, a nose, and a mouth, the
present-day computer has input devices (keyboard, joystick, mouse, or
scanner), output devices (monitor, printer, or plotter), a memory (hard
drive and main memory) and a processor. Just as the arms and legs can
be thin or fat and long or short, and the ears, nose and mouth can be big
or small and delicate or gross, so can the computer-design be clumsy or
elegant and angular or streamlined. Just as human beings can have one
of several possible skin tones (light, dark), hair-colors (blond, brown,
black), and eye-colors (blue, gray, brown), so can a computer have: a
beige, gray or black housing; a reflecting or non-reflecting screen; a
black-and-white or color monitor. Characteristic traits such as these are
fixed at the time of birth or fabrication. Afterwards, they usually remain
unchanged unless damage or injury occurs, as was the case with Drake
McHugh. For both human beings and computers, the distribution of
the traits among the total population is determined by the public (by
those active in the marriage market or in the computer market).
Human beings develop behavioral dispositions, for example, to eat
a little or a lot, to speak slowly or quickly, or to read often or rarely.
Computers also show behavioral patterns: the keys can be springy or
stiff, and hardly or highly delayed; the processor can be slow or fast;
the printer can function reliably or faultily.
Of greater interest in this context are, however, the dispositions which
the computer-users attribute to their computers (see Leu 1993): They
regard them as
— pedantic or flexible,
— reliable or unreliable,
— obliging or unwieldy,
— friendly or stubborn,
— finicky or easily pleased,
— honest or insidious.
Each of these assessments is based on behavior. They interpret
the experiences gained on many occasions (see Fig. 2).
For computers and human beings, the manifest material traits and
behavioral dispositions are both included in what we have called 'self
in the narrow sense': (P\P(b)}. The material traits and some of the
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Figure 2. 77ze w^er creates a PC in his/her own likeness (drawing by Elwood H. Smith, in
Kantrowitz 1994: 51)
elementary dispositional characteristics belong to the options which were
determined at the factory and can, therefore, hardly be changed. The user
(and the computer) simply have to accept them.
But what about dispositions such as being pedantic vs. flexible, reliable
vs. unreliable, obliging vs. unwieldy, friendly vs. stubborn, finicky vs. easily
pleased, honest vs. insidious? If the user attributes these to the computer,
then these dispositions belong to the computer's other-conceived self:
{P\G(a,P(by)}.
In cases in which the user empathizes strongly with the computer, it
is possible that, in addition to these selves on the reflection levels 0 and 1,
a third level is reached: users who, despite all attempts, are unable to
find a file on their computer might accuse the computer of trying to hide
the file. They curse and call their computer names. Then later, they
might forget to save a different file before deleting it. In their despair,
they blame the computer for losing the file, saying that the computer
was getting even for being cursed at earlier.
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The computer industry tries to counter such user disruptions of the
work atmosphere with software which supplies the computer with a
tension-reducing human demeanor. After turning on the computer, the
computer visually and audibly greets the user: 'Hi Joe, how are you
today?' Having made a mistake, the user is politely made aware that
s/he has not followed the rules: This was a mistake. Please try again'.
Having accomplished a difficult task, the user is rewarded with a praising
remark on the monitor: 'Well done!'
All of these measures facilitate the user's impression that the computer
is a communication partner (or a playmate). The technical literature
differentiates between user conduct in accordance with the partner meta-
phor (Maaß 1984) and user conduct in accordance with the instrument
or media metaphor (Andersen 1990). The majority of authors object to
the anthropomorphization of the computer, arguing that: this is the
result of a misunderstanding; face-to-screen interaction with the
computer must not be interpreted as face-to-face communication with
a human partner; the computer is unable to communicate in the strict
sense since it lacks characteristics such as normativeness, affectivity,
contextuality, historicity, sociality, personality, freedom, and conscious-
ness (see Debatin 1994: 14); the computer can at the most be attributed
a virtual self; wanting to communicate with this virtual self is an illusion.
In the light of this controversy, let us summarize the facts once again
and then determine under which conditions the virtual computer-self
could develop into a real self.
1. Due to its manifest physical features, it is unavoidable that
every computer has a self in the narrow sense:
(SI) (P\P(b)}
For example, it is angular, streamlined, gray, non-reflecting, springy,
hardly delayed, multi-colored and super-fast.
2. Through user attribution, the computer acquires an other-
conceived self:
(S3) {P\G(a9 P(b))}
For example, the computer is considered pedantic, reliable, unwieldy,
stubborn, and finicky.
3. In the same manner, the computer is given an other-intended self:
(S5) [P\I(a9 />(£>))}
Users are often disappointed with the operating results and transfer
this disappointment to the computer. They want the computer to become
less unwieldy, stubborn, and finicky and become more obliging, user
friendly, and easily pleased.
4. The more involved computer freaks attribute a self-conceived self
to the computer in that they assume that the computer considers
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itself the better calculator, chess player, pilot, etc. In this manner, the
computer receives an other-conceived self-conceived self:
(S9) [P\G(a, G(b, P(bm
The dynamics of the user-computer interaction entail that the features,
P(b), attributed here differ from those attributed to the computer in the
other-intended self.
5. Computer freaks also assume that their computers have their own
intentions, which gives the computer an other-conceived self-intended self:
(510) {P\G(a91(b, />(&)))}
After the tenth attempt to retrieve a specific file from the computer, an
imaginative user can hardly avoid thinking that the computer senses a
certain satisfaction at its anal-retentive character and intends to hold
onto the text forever.
6. Finally, we have to reckon with an other-intended self-conceived self:
(511) {P\I(a, G(b, P(bM
Users who cannot get the better of their computer or its game program
wish that it would regard itself as being less perfect and act a little more
human.
7. As in romantic human relationships, computer freaks are often
motivated to demand that their partner, the computer, try harder to meet
their needs. They want the computer to be capable of self-wishes, and
they believe that this would be the first step towards its improvement.
(512) {P\I(a, I(b, P(b)))}
8. Finally, in more complicated situations in which the user has verbally
abused the computer and afterwards feels himself/herself punished by
the computer for doing so, s/he will think: 'You want me to consider you
more honest, huh? Then start acting like it!' In this case, we are dealing
with an other-conceived self-intended other-conceived self:
(S8) {P\G(a,I(b, G(a, P(Z>))))}
The sub-selves in this list are located on the reflection levels RSO through
RS3 (see Fig. 1). What is still needed to complete the total-self on all
levels of reflection are the following.
9. The computer's self-conceived self (reflection level RSI):
(S2) {P\G(b, P(b»}
This self would be involved if the computer were able to regard itself,
for example, as pedantic, reliable, obliging, friendly, finicky, and honest
(as users sometimes assume (S9) or wish (Sll) to be possible).
10. The computer's self-intended self (reflection level RSI):
(S4) {P\I(b, />(£))}
This self would be involved if the computer could intend, for example, to
be less pedantic, unwieldy, and stubborn (as users sometimes assume
(S10) or wish (SI2) to be possible).
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11. The computer's self-conceived other-conceived self (reflection
level RS2):
(56) {P\G(b, G(a, P(bM
This self would be involved if the computer could believe that the
user regards it, for example, as unwieldy, stubborn, and insidious, or as
obliging, user friendly, and honest.
12. The computer's self-intended other-conceived self (reflection
level RS2):
(57) {P\I(b, G(a, P(bm
This self would be involved if the computer could want the user to regard
it, for example, as less unwieldy, stubborn, and insidious, i.e., as obliging,
user-friendly, and honest (the user presumes this type of computer-wish
in S8).
13. The computer's self-conceived other-intended self (reflection
level RS2):
(513) {P\G(b, I(a, P(bM
This self would be involved if the computer could have an idea of the user's
needs and could believe that the user wants it to be obliging, user-friendly,
and honest.
14. The computer's self-intended other-intended self (reflection
level RS2):
(514) (P\I(b, I(a, P(bM
This self would be involved if the computer were able to wish for
the user's wishes. For example, the computer could want the user to
want it to be more flexible, to operate quicker, and to have a larger
memory.
In accordance with the stratified total-self shown in Figure 1, further
computer sub-selves can be postulated at the higher levels of reflection;
discussing them, however, would not add anything new to our current
train of thought.
If we analyze the RSI and RS2 sub-selves that are not part of today's
interaction with computers according to the partner metaphor, we realize
that they all contain more or less complex feature attributions which
are embedded either in G(b, ...) or in 7(6, ...). Those who want to
provide their computers with these sub-selves must, therefore, enable
them to believe and intend things.
Let it be noted, however, that it would be a wrong solution to program
the computer to believe and intend certain things. Such an engineering
solution would deny the computer the ability to adapt itself to each user
and, based on the user's individual operating conduct, to develop a con-
cept of his/her habits, assessments, and wishes. The computer must only
be programmed to be able to believe and intend as such. It must be so
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equipped that it becomes able to produce internal representations of its
own traits and those of others (that is, 'to believe') and to evaluate these
with regard to its own preferences (that is, 'to intend').
Being so equipped, the computer would be able to develop the hereto-
fore missing half of its total-self. The self-development process could
take place as with young Reagan, proceeding from the other-concepts,
self-wishes, and other-wishes (see the formulas [9] through [11] in the
fifth section — 'Self-development through illusion and simulation').
Would it not be helpful to own a PC that, just because it believes that
user a\ considers it to be flexible, tries to justify this assessment by
choosing the most effective shortcuts in all operation sequences? Or a
PC that, because it believes that user a2 wants it to be pedantic, reviews
each step of an operation sequence with him/her explicitly? Or a PC
that independently looks for an apparently lost file by trying to guess
the correct code words based on the user's failed attempts? Or a PC
that corrects spelling and punctuation errors on its own because it thinks
they do not correspond to the user's writing intentions? Or a PC that
rounds out its user's incomplete commands and then executes them?
Or a PC that, after the user's nth failed attempt to formulate a text,
uses its own formulation program to produce a new text variation that
better corresponds to the assumed intentions of the user?
All of these possibilities are opened up if the computer is given the
ability to believe and to intend. The Reagan Effect takes care of the rest.
As a cognitive system that can believe and intend things, the computer
could use its experiences of working with the user to independently
develop itself and (re-)organize its technical capabilities. The computer
is not given its self-conceived self and its self-intended self, but rather
has to develop these based on the other-conceived self and the other-
intended self with which the user confronts it. In this manner, the
computer is able to expand and change its self in the narrow sense.
This takes place through the level reduction of attributed traits. Attribu-
tion through others motivates self-presentation, and this results in
self-development.
Such a cognitive system is capable of each type of self-presentation
discussed in the third and fourth sections since these are simply various
constellations of believing, intending, and causing trait attribution. The
higher the level of reflection reached by the system in its work with the
user, the more the computer will resemble the user. It will automatically
develop from a mere instrument to a thinking partner, from an anon-
ymous configuration of data to a collaborator capable of adaptation.
Discussions about the metaphorics of these descriptions will become
unnecessary.
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An artificial cognitive system with the ability to think and to intend
things will not only possess the unavoidable self in the narrow sense, which
the psychoanalyst Khan attributed to his colleague Winnicott. It will
also possess a total-self that is unyielding insofar as it strives for an
inner consistency between its sub-selves on the higher and lower levels
of reflection. And its total-self will be invulnerable to the degree to which
this striving for inter-level consistency enables it to remove contradic-
tions resulting from physical damage. This will be accomplished either by
dispensing with self-traits on the lowest level or by redeveloping the lost
traits based on the mechanism of level reduction. Each partner inter-
acting with this cognitive system will be able to form his/her own
picture of it; although the computer will not 'try to force its own way
of being' on its partners, it will still always 'unavoidably be itself.
These promising characteristics of the artificial cognitive systems
concerned should make it worthwhile to devote ourselves more seriously
than before to the semantic and pragmatic research of that which makes
them possible: believing and intending.
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